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Casenote

Doubting Thomasville's Ability-Grouping
Program: Holton v. City of Thomasville
School District

I.

INTRODUCTION

The summer of 2007 was an active season for education cases in the
United States federal court system. While the Supreme Court heard
several cases related to freedom of speech and school race issues,1 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit heard its own
case, Holton v.City of Thomasville School District,2 in which the court
examined the City of Thomasville School District's ("the School District")

1. The Supreme Court held 5-4 in favor of a public school principal who prevented a
student from displaying a banner with the phrase "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" at a function
attended by other students. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622, 2629 (2007). The
Court held that public schools do not violate students' First Amendment rights when acting
to protect those under their care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as
encouraging illegal drug use. Id. at 2629. In another 5-4 decision, the Court held that a
school district's voluntary racial integration program cannot use racial classification as its
sole classification mechanism. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
127 S. Ct. 2738, 2760 (2007).
2. 490 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
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ability-grouping program. 3 The court held that the School District's
program was neither intentionally discriminatory nor the result of prior
de jure segregation by the district.4 The Eleventh Circuit's decision
extends the line of cases allowing school districts great deference in the
implementation and continuation of their academic programs. This
includes programs that result in racially imbalanced school populations,
so long as the programs are neither the remnants of past de jure
segregation nor the result of present intentional discrimination.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The year 2007 marked the second time in two years that the City of
Thomasville School District appeared before the Eleventh Circuit to
justify its educational programs amid claims of racial discrimination. 5
The sole remaining issue on appeal in Holton v. City of Thomasville
School District (Holton II)6 was the legality of the School District's
policy of ability grouping.7 The Eleventh Circuit previously addressed
the other aspects of the original order by the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Georgia in 2005. 8 A review of the
district court's decision, and that of the Eleventh Circuit in Holton v.
City of Thomasville School District (Holton I),' provides relevant
background for understanding the Eleventh Circuit Court's holding in
Holton I. A brief introduction to the concept of ability grouping prefaces
this discussion.

3. Id. at 1259. Ability grouping is a method used by school systems to place students
on different learning tracks based upon the students' perceived ability to learn. In theory,
the programs are designed to create a learning environment in which slower students can
learn at a slower pace and therefore not become overwhelmed, while students with a
greater ability to learn will be challenged so that they do not become bored by a slower
pace of learning. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 443-45 (D.D.C. 1967).
4. Holton 11, 490 F.3d at 1263.
5. See Holton v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist. (Holton 11), 490 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir.
2007) (per curiam); Holton v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist. (Holton 1), 425 F.3d 1325 (11th
Cir. 2005). An initial determination of liability was never made against the City of
Thomasville School District; therefore, the School District never operated under judicial
oversight concerning its prior de jure segregated system. Thomas County Branch of the
NAACP v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist., 299 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1342 & n.2 (M.D. Ga.
2004).
6. 490 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
7. Id. at 1259.
8. Holton I, 425 F.3d at 1328.
9. 425 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2005).
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Ability Grouping

Ability grouping, also known as tracking, is a well-established, albeit
controversial mechanism used in school districts throughout the United
States.1" The basis for an ability-grouping system is to classify
students within a school based upon a perception of their ability to
learn." The concept revolves around the theory that different students
learn at different levels. According to this theory, students should be
placed on different tracks that allow each student to learn at the
appropriate level.' 2 Under such a plan, students on either end of the
spectrum would benefit by learning at the proper pace.' 3 Specifically,
the policy underlying tracking is that brighter students need to be
intellectually challenged so that they do not become bored and lazy,
while underperforming students require a more remedial approach so
that they do not struggle through a curriculum they cannot comprehend,
potentially resulting in frustration and depression. 4
The topic of whether ability grouping is an effective tool to accomplish
this goal has been widely debated in the legal and educational communities.' 5 Opponents cite a growing achievement gap between those on
higher and lower tracks. 6 Indeed, at least one recent study proffered
the use of detracking to close these gaps, stating that "[aichievement
follows from opportunities-opportunities that tracking denies. " 17 A
number of studies have also called attention to the fact that low-income
and minority students are disproportionately placed in lower tracks.'"
While a handful of cases have held ability-grouping programs to be
unconstitutional, the basis for these decisions has rested largely on

10.

STUART BIEGEL, EDUCATION AND THE LAW 353 (2006) ("In the public schools today,

a large percentage of students continue to be separated out from their peers either for
programmatic reasons or on the basis of perceived ability.").
11. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 444 (D.D.C. 1967).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 444-45.
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., KEVIN G. WELNER, LEGAL RIGHTS, LOCAL WRONGS: WHEN COMMUNITY
CONTROL COLLIDES WITH EDUCATIONAL EQUALITY (2001); JEANNIE OAKES, KEEPING TRACK:
How SCHOOLS STRUCTURE INEQUALITY (2d ed. 2005).

16. Carol Corbett Burris & Kevin G. Welner, Closing the Achievement Gap by
Detracking, PHI DELTA KAPPAN, Apr. 2005, at 594.
17. Id. at 598.
18. See, e.g., Note, Teaching Inequality: The Problem of Public School Tracking, 102
HARv. L. REV. 1318 (1989).
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findings that the school systems' policies were based on underlying
intentional discrimination.1 9
B.

District Court's InitialFindings
The Thomas County Branch of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (the "NAACP") filed suit on behalf of
African-American students enrolled at public elementary, middle, and
high schools within the City of Thomasville School District. The
plaintiffs alleged that the school system failed to uphold its constitutional obligation to dismantle its formerly de jure segregated system and
was operating a segregated public school system in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution" and Title VI of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964.21
The plaintiffs sought judicial supervision of the School District's
desegregation efforts.22 The district court, however, found that while
racial imbalances existed in several areas of the School District, these
imbalances were not traceable to the system's prior de jure segregation
and were not the result of intentional discrimination on the part of the
School District.23
The City of Thomasville School District operated a de jure racially
segregated school system at the time of the United States Supreme
Court's seminal 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education2 4 and
continued to operate a racially segregated school system until 1965.25
The School District then implemented several desegregation plans
resulting in more racially balanced schools. The School District's first
plan, a freedom-of-choice plan allowing parents to choose the school their
children would attend, failed to racially balance the School District.
However, the School District's subsequent school assignment plan was
successful, reorganizing student attendance zones to create racially
balanced schools across the School District. By the late 1970s, though,
demographic factors had ushered in the reemergence of several
identifiable racially imbalanced schools within the School District,
especially at the elementary school level. 26 Following a lengthy
19. See McNeal v. Tate County Sch. Dist., 508 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1975); Hobson, 269
F. Supp. 401.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7 (2000); Thomas County Branch of the NAACP, 299
F. Supp. 2d at 1342.
22. Thomas County Branch of the NAACP, 299 F. Supp. 2d at 1342.
23. Id. at 1367.
24. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
25. Thomas County Branch of the NAACP, 299 F. Supp. 2d at 1352.
26. Id. at 1352-57.
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discussion regarding the racial imbalances among schools within the
district and an application of the factors set out in Green v. County
School Board,27 the district court found that the School District had
carried its burden of proving that the racial imbalances were not
traceable to the School District's previous de jure segregated system. 28
The specific plan at issue in the present case-whether the School
District's use of ability grouping was discriminatory-also passed
scrutiny at the district court level.29 The School District had operated
some form of an ability-grouping program since the end of its de jure
segregation.3 ° Under the plan at issue, the students were grouped at
several stages during their time in the public school system. First,
students in kindergarten and elementary school were grouped based on
perceived abilities and actual performance. Second, middle school
students were placed into classes based upon a combination of factors
that included standardized test scores and teacher recommendations.
Third, high school students were given the ability to choose their own
31
classes under the guidance of teachers, counselors, and parents.
The district court found that "'a disproportionate number of low
income children (most of whom happen to be black) are placed in the
lower ability groups' and tend to remain in these lower tracks throughout their academic careers." 32 The racial disparity among classes in the
Thomasville School District was determined by the district court to be
a result of the impoverished conditions the students faced, including the
absence of a positive and supportive background that is crucial in
preparing students to learn.33 The district court commented that
"'[wihen the racial makeup of a community correlates directly with
poverty and when poverty correlates with perceived academic readiness,
as it does in Thomasville, "this ability tracking" inevitably leads to

27. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). In Green the United States Supreme Court held that the New
Kent County, Virginia school system had not complied with the Court's mandate to
desegregate the school system because the school district's freedom-of-choice plan had not
accomplished racial integration within the district. Id. at 441. The Court provided a list
of factors to guide lower courts in determining whether a school district had effectively
dismantled its segregated system. Id. The factors included student assignment, faculty,
staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities. Id.
28. Thomas County Branch of the NAACP, 299 F. Supp. 2d at 1367.
29. Id. at 1358.
30. Holton 11, 490 F.3d at 1259.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1260 (quoting Thomas County Branch of the NAACP, 299 F. Supp. 2d at
1358).
33. Id. (citing Thomas County Branch of the NAACP, 299 F. Supp. 2d at 1358).
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ability groups that are racially imbalanced."'"4 The district court ruled
that "it was not the intention of the [School District's] tracking system
to segregate students based upon race" and that the School District did
not manipulate the tracking system to track students based upon
race. 5 The district court expressed no opinion on whether the disparity
in educational opportunity between poor children and wealthier children
would create a cause of action. 6 "No matter how tempted the [district
clourt may be to intervene and attempt to 'fix the system,' a court is illequipped for such a task. Moreover, it does not have the authority to act

as a super-school board or social scientist

. . . .0'

According to the

district court, the court's function is to remedy violations of federal law,
and there is no provision mandating that "poor children be guaranteed
a high quality education."38
C. Holton I
In Holton I, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed each
aspect of the district court's order with the exception of the findings of
fact and conclusions of law relating to the School District's abilitygrouping program. 9 In remanding that aspect of the district court's
order, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the appellants that the district
court failed to properly apply the standard established in McNeal v. Tate
4
County School District.
" The McNeal standard allows a school district
to implement an ability-grouping program, even when there is a
segregative effect on the school population, so long as the "assignment
method is not based on the present results of past segregation or will
remedy such results through better educational opportunities" for those
discriminated against.4"
While ability-grouping programs may create racial imbalances within
classrooms, employing these programs is not necessarily per se
unconstitutional.4 2
Indeed, school systems may implement ability

34. Id. at 1260 n.4 (brackets in original) (quoting Thomas County Branch of the
NAACP, 299 F. Supp. 2d at 1359).
35. Thomas County Branch of the NAACP, 299 F. Supp. 2d at 1359.
36. Id. at 1368 n.31.
37. Id. at 1368.
38. Id.
39. Holton 1, 425 F.3d at 1328.
40. Id. at 1347-48; 508 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1975).
41. McNeal, 508 F.2d at 1020. The Eleventh Circuit adopted as precedent the decisions
rendered by the former Fifth Circuit prior to October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard,
661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (5th Cir. Nov. 1981) (en banc).
42. Holton I, 425 F.3d at 1346-47 (quoting Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989,994 (5th
Cir. Unit A June 1981)).
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grouping, even if the policy results in some segregation, "so long... as
such a practice is genuinely motivated by educational concerns and not
discriminatory motives."43 While educators are best suited to resolve
the question of whether a policy is more beneficial than detrimental to
students, the question of whether the policy is constitutional is one for
the courts to decide." The court must determine whether a district's
ability-grouping program is based on the present results of past
discrimination or whether it will remedy those results.45 Here, the
district court failed to properly conduct this inquiry.46
"Because
'[p]roper resolution of any desegregation case turns on a careful
assessment of its facts,"'47 the Eleventh Circuit ordered the district
court to reconsider the School District's ability-grouping program in light
of the McNeal standard.48
D.

District Court on Remand

On remand, the district court conceded that it had failed to properly
and completely apply the McNeal standard. 49 The court made additional findings of fact and reapplied the McNeal standard as directed by the
Eleventh Circuit.5 ° The district court determined that (1) the racial
imbalances in the school system were the result of the School District's
ability-grouping program; (2) the children were placed in academic
tracks based upon their perceived ability; and (3) this perceived ability
was based upon the students' "impoverished circumstances more than
anything else and was certainly not traceable to the de jure segregated
school system."5 Also, the district court found that no child attending
a school in the City of Thomasville School District at the time of the trial
had ever been enrolled in the School District's previous de jure
segregated system. Furthermore, the court found that the achievement
level of the black students in the certified class who were placed in lower
ability groups was not the result of the School District's prior de jure
segregation.52

43. Castaneda,648 F.2d at 996.
44. Holton I, 425 F.3d at 1347.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1347-48.
47. Id. at 1348 (brackets in original) (quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 474
(1992)).
48. Id. at 1328.
49. Holton 11, 490 F.3d at 1260.
50. Id. at 1260-61.
51. Id. at 1260.
52. Id. at 1261.
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E.

Holton II
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court
following remand of the case, holding that the School District's abilitygrouping program did not intentionally discriminate against AfricanAmerican students and that a student's "lesser-perceived ability" was not
the result of racial discrimination by the School District, but rather
resulted from that student's poverty.5 3 Accordingly, the conditions
which led to the racial imbalance in the School District were not the
present results of past de jure segregation.54 The court held that the
School District's use of an ability-grouping plan was not, therefore, a
violation of the students' constitutional rights.55
III.
A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Historically Significant Case Law

The Holton cases have their roots in a long line of caselaw beginning
with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Brown v.Board of
56 In Brown
Education (Brown ).
I, the Court overruled Plessy v.
Ferguson," holding the "separate but equal" doctrine to be irreconcilable with the Fourteenth Amendment." The Court in Brown I declared
that "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal'
has no place."59 The Court held that the "segregation of children in
public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical
facilities and other 'tangible' factors may be equal, deprive[s] the
children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities," and
is therefore in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of
equal protection. 60
After having identified the constitutional violation at issue, one year
later in Brown v. Board of Education (Brown iJ),61 the Court undertook
the more challenging task of providing guidance to local school districts

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 1263. The court does not define the term "poverty" in its opinion.
Id.
Id.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495.
Id.
Id. at 493.
349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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about how to implement the ruling from Brown J.62 Impatient with the
lack of action taken in the year after Brown I and less concerned with
the importance of local control of public schools than with desegregation
of these schools, the Court placed greater authority in the hands of the
lower courts to fashion remedies that would desegregate the schools.
The Court, however, provided only minimal guidance to the lower courts
on how the mandate from Brown I should be accomplished.64 The
Court stated, "In fashioning and effectuating the decrees [of Brown I],
the courts will be guided by equitable principles," and the courts should
issue such orders and decrees that are "necessary and proper to admit
[students] to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis."6 5
The only time constraint placed on local school officials was the
instruction that they were to desegregate their school systems "with all
deliberate speed."6 6 Many school officials and politicians used this
vague guidance to delay the implementation of the widely unpopular
desegregation policies.67
Concerned with the lack of progress by school systems across the
country, Congress in 1964 passed the Civil Rights Act.68 Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act specifically addresses racial discrimination in federally
assisted school systems. 69 The Supreme Court also criticized the lack
of progress by local school districts by stating in the same year that "'the
time for mere "deliberate speed" has run out."'7 The Court restated
this conclusion four years later in Green v. County School Board7' and
held that delays in dismantling segregated systems were no longer
tolerable because the principles established in Brown I and II were no
longer new and novel.72 School boards were given the burden to "come
forward with a plan [to desegregate their school systems] that promises
realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now."
In
Green the Court provided a list of factors to guide lower courts in

62. Thomas County Branch of the NAACP v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist., 299 F.
Supp. 2d 1340, 1345 (M.D. Ga. 2004).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Brown 11, 349 U.S. at 300-01.
66. Id. at 301 (emphasis added).
67. Thomas County Branch of the NAACP, 299 F. Supp. 2d at 1345.
68. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7 (2000).
69. Id. § 2000d; Thomas County Branch of the NAACP, 299 F. Supp. 2d at 1347.
70. Thomas County Branch of the NAACP, 299 F. Supp. 2d at 1347 (quoting Griffin v.
County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964)).
71. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
72. See id. at 438.
73. Id. at 439.
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determining whether a school district had effectively dismantled its
formerly segregated system.74 These factors included student assignment, faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, and
facilities.7"
In Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of Education,6 the Court
provided more specific guidance to lower courts and local school boards,
setting forth specific criteria designed to build upon the factors
established in Green.7 7 In Swann the Court stated that the key
objective was to "eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of stateimposed segregation.""5 If school officials failed to take affirmative
steps to eliminate segregation "'root and branch,"' judicial intervention
would be appropriate.7" The Court also clarified that its mandate to
desegregate schools does not require that every school in every community reflect the racial composition of the school system as a whole or that
school systems have a duty to remedy racial prejudice unrelated to the
prior acts of the de jure segregated school system itself.s°
Two additional cases from the United States Supreme Court, Keyes v.
School District No. 181 and Freeman v. Pitts,2 further addressed
current racial imbalances in school systems. The first case established
what is known as the Keyes presumption: if a school board has intentionally engaged in segregation in the past, any present segregation within
the system is presumed to be a result of that intentional segregation-a
presumption that the local school board bears the burden of overcoming. 3 The Court in Keyes also acknowledged the challenge of deciding
whether present racial imbalances were traceable to a district's prior
intentional segregation or whether the imbalances were the result of
factors outside the control of the district.84 While the Court rejected
the notion that "remoteness in time has any relevance to the issue of
intent," it did recognize that "at some point in time the relationship
between past segregative acts and present segregation may become so

74. Id. at 435; see supra text accompanying note 27.
75. Thomas County Branch of the NAACP, 299 F. Supp. 2d at 1347 n.10 (citing Green,
391 U.S. at 435). "These factors have become commonly known as the 'Green factors."' Id.
76. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
77. Thomas County Branch of the NAACP, 299 F. Supp. 2d at 1348.
78. Swann, 402 U.S. at 15.
79. Id. (quoting Green, 391 U.S. at 438).
80. Id. at 23-24.
81. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
82. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
83. Thomas County Branch of the NAACP, 299 F. Supp. 2d at 1350-51 (citing Keyes,
413 U.S. at 208, 211).
84. Id. at 1351.
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attenuated as to be incapable of supporting a finding of de jure
segregation warranting judicial intervention." 5
The second case, Freeman, stands for the proposition that a school
district need not satisfy all of the Green factors before it will be released
from judicial supervision under each of the factors.8 6 The Court held
that the end goal of judicial supervision is to return the school district
to local control when the district has shown a good faith effort in
remedying its past de jure segregation and where any remaining racial
imbalances are not the result of district policies.8" When appropriate,
partial relinquishment of control by the court can accomplish this goal
by removing supervision over areas in which the district has complied,
freeing up resources to focus on remedying the other areas still in
question. 8 At the time of the decision in Freeman, the DeKalb County
School System had become more racially imbalanced than when judicial
supervision was ordered in 1969. 89 However, the district was ultimately freed from judicial control because the Court held that the school
district's racial imbalances were the result of demographic factors, not
vestiges of the formerly segregated system, and that the school system
had acted in good faith to remedy the effects of its past de jure
segregation.9 °
B.

The Legal Framework Applicable to Holton II

A school district's obligation is to eliminate the vestiges of its prior
discrimination to the extent possible.9 1 Once a plaintiff shows "that
current racial imbalances exist within a school system, '[tihe burden
then shifts to the school district to demonstrate that the racial imbalances are not the result of its present or past discriminatory action."'92
The school district must show that any current racial imbalance is not
the result of the prior de jure segregated system.93 If the school district
can demonstrate that the racial imbalances within the system are
"'substantially caused"' by demographic or other external factors outside

85. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 210-11.
86. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 490-91.
87. Id. at 491-92.
88. Id. at 493.
89. Id. at 475-77.
90. Mills v. Freeman, 942 F. Supp. 1449, 1456-64 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
91. Holton v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist. (HoltonI/), 490 F.3d 1257, 1261 (11th Cir.
2007) (per curiam) (citing Holton v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist. (Holton /),425 F.3d
1325, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005)).
92. Id. (brackets in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Holton I, 425
F.3d at 1338).
93. Id. (quoting Freeman,503 U.S. at 494).
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the school system's control, the district will overcome the presumption
that segregative intent, past or present, is the cause.94 There will
therefore be no constitutional violation.9 5 The school district is only
required to prove that the demographic factors are a substantial cause
for the racial imbalances in the district, rather than the sole cause.9 6
The plaintiff, on the other hand, must show that the demographic shifts
are in some way connected to the district's prior de jure segregation or
to other discriminatory conduct by the district to maintain the presumption that the district's policies are the cause of the current racial
imbalances.9 7
While ability-grouping programs may have the effect of creating racial
imbalances within a school district, these programs are not per se
unconstitutional.98 Ability-grouping programs will be permissible so
long as they satisfy the McNeal standard.99 The segregative effect of
the assignment method must not be based on present results of past
segregation, or the program must remedy the effects of past discrimination through better educational opportunities for the adversely affected
students.100
IV.

COURT'S RATIONALE

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding
there was no reversible error.''
The court issued a per curiam
opinion, with Chief Judge Edmondson and Circuit Judge Tjoflat joined
by Circuit Judge John R. Gibson of the Eighth Circuit sitting by
designation.' °2
In addressing whether the School District's ability-grouping plan was
lawful, the court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding
that the racial imbalances that existed in the School Districts's abilitygrouping program were the result of demographic factors (such as
poverty) and not the present effects of prior de jure segregation or any

94. Id. at 1261-62 (quoting Holton 1, 425 F.3d at 1339).
95. Id. at 1261.
96. Id. at 1262 n.7 (citing Holton 1, 425 F.3d at 1339).
97. Id. (citing Holton 1, 425 F.3d at 1339).
98. Id. at 1262 (citing Holton I, 425 F.3d at 1346).
99. Id. (citing Holton I, 425 F.3d at 1347).
100. Id. (citing Holton 1, 425 F.3d at 1347). The district court did not address, nor did
the parties argue, whether the ability-grouping program in the City of Thomasville School
District intended to remedy the effects of past segregation by providing better educational
opportunities for African-American students within the district. Id. at 1262 n.8.
101. Holton v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist. (Holton I), 490 F.3d 1257, 1259 (11th Cir.
2007) (per curiam).
102. Id.
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current intentional discrimination by the School District. 103
The
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court (1) correctly applied
the McNeal standard and (2) complied with the court's order to make
10 4
additional findings in light of this standard.
The court of appeals further held that on remand, the district court
correctly and fully applied the McNeal standard by asking whether the
School District's method of assignment through its ability-grouping
program was based upon the present results of past de jure segregation.' 05 The district court found that the Thomasville School District
based its ability grouping on the perceived abilities of the students, and
the lesser-perceived ability of black students in the School District was
based more upon impoverished conditions than anything. 10 6 Furthermore, as applied to the students in the certified class who were placed
in lower achievement groups, the placement of these students was not
a result of prior de jure segregation by the School District.' 7 Because
the district court correctly applied the McNeal standard, the Eleventh
Circuit granted substantial deference to the district court's findings
0
under the clear-error standard."
'
While Thomasville's ability-grouping program has the effect of creating
racial imbalances in the School District by placing lower-income black
students in lower tracks, the court held that this in itself does not create
a constitutional violation. 10 9 According to the court, the plaintiffs
failed to preserve the presumption that these effects were the result of
prior de jure segregation on the part of the School District because they
did not show "that either these students' lesser-perceived abilities or
their impoverished circumstances are 'the result of the prior de jure
segregation or some other discriminatory conduct [on the part of the
School District].' "' 1
The plaintiffs' main argument was that the School District's abilitygrouping program intentionally discriminated against black students and
that racial disparities within the program itself, as well as demographic
factors, caused the racial imbalance within the School District's

103. Id. at 1262.
104. Id. at 1261.
105. Id. at 1262.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. (citing NAACP, Jacksonville Branch v. Duval County Sch., 273 F.3d 960, 965
(11th Cir. 2001)).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1263 (quoting Holton v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist. (Holton I), 425 F.3d
1325, 1339 (11th Cir. 2005)).
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1
The Eleventh Circuit was not persuaded by the eviclassrooms."
the plaintiffs on this point. Rather, the court held the
by
offered
dence
evidence in the record supported the district court's findings that (1) the
School District's ability-grouping program did not intentionally
discriminate against black students and (2) a student's lesser-perceived
ability was not the result of racial discrimination but instead resulted
from that student's poverty.112 As such, the conditions which led to the
racial imbalance in the School
District "were not the present results of
11 3
past de jure segregation."
The School District offered persuasive evidence to support the
conclusion that "the placement of students [in the School District]
correlates to their perceived abilities and that socio-economic status is
The School
a strong determinant of a student's academic ability."'
District also presented compelling evidence that the program's assignment method was based upon the student's perceived abilities as well as
teachers' perceptions of the student's past and present classroom
performance." 5 This methodology lessens the chance for intentionally
discriminatory placement by allowing students several avenues to
advance to a higher group. The School District also presented expert
testimony which suggested a high correlation between poverty and
academic ability.116
This evidence further supported the School
District's position that the racial imbalances caused by the program were
not intentional. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court's
findings on remand were not clearly erroneous and therefore affirmed
the district
court's judgment in favor of the City of Thomasville School
11 7
District.

V.

IMPLICATIONS

The decision in this case is familiar territory for the State of Georgia.
The 1992 decision in favor of the DeKalb County School System in
Freeman v. Pitts"' was a landmark decision that cleared the way for
school districts across the state and the nation to free themselves from
federally-mandated desegregation orders even where racial imbalances
remained within the school district.

111.

Id.

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1263 n.13.
Id.
Id. at 1263.
503 U.S. 467 (1992).
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More recently, in 2007 the Bibb County School District emerged from
its long-standing court-supervised desegregation order-more than fifty
years after Brown I was decided.119 Bibb County, like Thomasville,
continues to face racial imbalances within its school district due to
demographic factors outside the control of the school board. As these
cases demonstrate, school systems will be allowed to operate districts
that contain what can amount to racially segregated schools and
classrooms so long as the racial imbalances are not the present result of
a district's past de jure segregation or renewed intentional discrimination on the part of the current system.
The Holton decisions reaffirm that even at the individual school level,
there can be racial imbalances within the classroom that do not trigger
judicial intervention. 2 ° As Holton II clarified, demographic factors
such as socioeconomic patterns may cause racial imbalances within
school districts.' 2 ' In fact, situations of this nature occur with frequency across the country as socioeconomic conditions significantly affect a
student's preparedness to learn and thus guide school district decisions
on the best academic program for that student. Consequently, racially
imbalanced classrooms are created and perpetuated. As the Eleventh
Circuit has repeatedly held, these districts are not acting unconstitutionally. 22 So long as the socioeconomic differences exist and track along
racial lines, school systems that exhibit racial imbalances will continue
to experience racial divides in the classroom. These racial and economic
disparities will trap many students in schools where their academic
needs are not met, and will ultimately result in these students never
realizing their full potential.'2 3 Nor will these students realize the
immeasurable benefits to be gained from learning in an integrated,
multicultural classroom setting.
Furthermore, the ability-grouping programs may aggravate the racial
imbalances by widening the student achievement gap along economic
and, therefore, racial lines. Students placed in higher ability groups are
likely to enjoy superior resources including better faculty and greater
community and parent involvement than those students placed in the
lower tracks. This problem is further exacerbated if children are not

119. Adams v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., No. 5:63-CV-1926 (WDO), 2007 WL 841945 (M.D. Ga.
Mar. 20, 2007) (slip copy).
120. See Holton v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist. (Holton I/), 490 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir.
2007) (per curiam); Holton v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist. (Holton I), 425 F.3d 1325 (11th
Cir. 2005).
121. 490 F.3d at 1261-62.
122. Holton 11, 490 F.3d 1257; Holton 1, 425 F.3d 1325.
123. Thomas County Branch of the NAACP v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist., 299 F.
Supp. 2d 1340, 1368 (M.D. Ga. 2004).
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reevaluated or otherwise allowed to easily move to a higher track. When
this does not occur, the "die is cast" as early as kindergarten, and the
children will remain on the lower track throughout 12their
academic
4
careers, absent parental involvement to induce change.
In its opinion in Holton II, the Eleventh Circuit relied on Freeman for
the notion that "'[als the de jure violation becomes more remote in time
and demographic changes intervene, it becomes less likely that a current
racial imbalance in a school district is a vestige of the prior de jure
system."'125 This quote encapsulates the notion that the further in
time our nation is removed from the era of de jure segregation, the less
likely it is that courts will find school districts to have committed a
constitutional violation based on present effects of prior discrimination.
It is therefore likely that for a court to strike down a school district's
ability-grouping plan, the court will have to find intentional discrimination by the district or elements of the plan that restrict the movement
of students between tracks. Thus, it becomes critical that children are
allowed to move to higher tracks. Otherwise it will be difficult to
provide equal educational opportunities for all children and to break the
cycle of impoverished economic conditions leading to lower academic
ability. Furthermore, school districts must ensure that the students in
lower ability groups receive the same quality and quantity of resources
as those in higher groups to help these students learn beyond their
perceived ability and the constraints of their impoverished conditions.
Educators must strive to prevent students from becoming mired in lower
tracks by constantly seeking to push the children toward higher
academic achievement.
The recent line of cases beginning with Keyes and Freeman and
continuing through Holton II, combined with measures such as the No
Child Left Behind Act, 2 6 signal a shift from a judicial remedy to a
legislative remedy. Under this framework, the solutions for a high
quality education for all students will not likely be the result of a judge
or of a court, but rather the solutions will result from the focus and work
of legislatures, local school boards, superintendents, and communities.
Advocates for children who are placed on lower tracks, regardless of
racial or socioeconomic background, should therefore focus their efforts
on working within the school system and not outside of it.

124, Id. at 1358.
125. Holton 11, 490 F.3d at 1263 n.14 (brackets in original) (quoting Freeman,503 U.S.
at 496).
126. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 20
U.S.C.).
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As Chief Justice Earl Warren famously stated more than fifty years
ago, "education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments." 127 Without question, this remains true today. Moreover, our nation's school districts should "strive to teach that our
strength comes from people of different races, creeds, and cultures" as
our nation fulfills its moral and ethical obligation of "creating an
integrated society that ensures equal opportunity for all its children."128 So long as a child's socioeconomic condition is a prominent
factor in determining the child's potential ability to learn-whether an
accurate indicator or not-conditions outside the control of the school
district will continue to create racial imbalances within schools. And to
the extent that lower-income and minority students are placed and
remain within lower tracks, it is unlikely that the cycle will be broken,
absent concerted efforts on the part of the school district, teachers,
parents, and the community to help lesser-performing students move up
the academic ladder.
WILLIAM BENJAMIN BRYANT

127. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
128. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2788,
2797 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

